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Abstract
We develop foundations for the view-based specification of software artifacts in
first-order logic. Standard notions of models and semantics of first-order logic are
generalized to partial models that do not have access to the entire global signa-
ture. At the model-theoretic level, this is achieved via the Smyth powerdomain
over the semantic universe of elements. At the logical level, we accomplish this
via the Smyth powerdomain over the standard two-valued booleans. A refinement
notion is developed and its soundness is proved for a fixed set of semantic elements.
Standard models and semantics of first-order logic are subsumed by our framework
as models in which all signature information is present (“complete models”). We
decompose our semantics into a consensus (the union of the Smyth powerdomain)
of an optimistic and a pessimistic semantics. That way, we may compute this se-
mantics as a standard model check in first-order logic over a model lifted by the
Smyth powerdomain.
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1 Introduction
The work presented in this paper makes a ﬁrst step at laying the semantic and
algorithmic foundations for property veriﬁcation over multiple and potentially
conﬂicting models — be they speciﬁcation descriptions or other abstractions
of software artifacts. We mention two important applications for such foun-
dations. In requirement engineering, diﬀerent stake holders formulate their
individual view of the requirements that a software artifact should meet. The
requirement elicitation process can therefore be greatly improved if (i) incon-
sistencies between these views can be detected and if (ii) speciﬁed properties
can be “veriﬁed” at this early stage in the software life cycle [25,24]. These
kinds of analyses are also needed in the evaluation of software artifacts in
a very late stage of design, implementation, or maintenance. For example,
xlinkit [23] is a tool that generates rule-based smart links and then analyzes
a collection of XML ﬁles for their consistency according to a set of rules.
These practical problems provide the context of our theoretical work. This
work can be broken down into two steps. In the ﬁrst step, semantic and
algorithmic machinery needs to be developed for verifying in a partial view
global properties expressed using predicate and function symbols that the
partial view may have no knowledge of. In the second step, semantic and
algorithmic machinery needs to be developed to enable reasoning over multiple
viewpoints. Although global property veriﬁcation is done at each partial view,
various forms of communication between some of the partial views should
provide the means for a more integrated global check of system properties. In
this paper we undertake the ﬁrst step only; the second step will be tackled in
future work.
We model views as conventional ﬁnite 3 models of ﬁrst-order logic, except
that individual views may not have access to the global signature of all views
involved. The question is then how to deﬁne a semantics of ﬁrst-order logic in
these views. We use part of the machinery of domain theory [1], notably the
Smyth powerdomain, to lift the standard ﬁrst-order-logic semantics to this par-
tial setting. The Smyth powerdomain turns classical two-valued propositional
logic into Kleene’s strong interpretation of three-valued logic [19]. Inspired by
[2], this three-valued semantics is decomposed into two semantics whose con-
sensus (the union of the Smyth powerdomain) recovers the original semantics.
This consensus, together with a translation of formulas into negation normal
form, is used to reduce our three-valued semantics to two standard semantics
of ﬁrst-order logic. Thus, three-valued model checking of global properties
in a partial model can be reduced to two-valued model checking of standard
models of ﬁrst-order logic.
3 Our results generalize to inﬁnite models by moving from ﬁnite partial orders to dcpos.
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Outline of paper
In Section 2, we deﬁne partial models that have only limited access to a
global signature. Section 3 uses these models to interpret global terms and
formulas. This is done from ﬁrst principles by applying the Smyth power-
domain to the set of semantic elements (for terms) and to the discrete set
of ordinary truth values {T, F} (for formulas). A reﬁnement preorder of par-
tial models is proposed in Section 4 and proved to be sound, provided that
the set of semantic elements remains the same. In Section 5, we decompose
our semantics into two semantics whose consensus (the union of the Smyth
powerdomain) recovers the original semantics. Section 6 uses this consensus,
together with a translation of formulas into negation normal form, to reduce
our three-valued semantics to two standard semantics of ﬁrst-order logic. In
Section 7, we describe related work and Section 8 concludes.
2 Models of views
First-order logic signature and syntax
We consider a ﬁrst-order logic with terms t and formulas φ deﬁned by the
grammar
t ::=x | f(t, t, . . . , t)
φ ::= | P (t, t, . . . , t) | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | ∃xφ,(1)
where x, f , and P range over sets of variables X , function symbols F , and
predicate symbols P (respectively), resulting in the signature
Σ
def
= (X ,F ,P).(2)
In this paper, we write “n” as a generic name for the arities ar(f) and ar(P ),
the number of arguments required for f and P (respectively). To simplify
our exposition, we omit sorts, types, and other structuring mechanisms. As
customary, we write φ1 ∨ φ2 for ¬(¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2), φ1 → φ2 for ¬(φ1 ∧ ¬φ2), and
∀xφ for ¬∃x¬φ.
Partial models
Fixing a nonempty, ﬁnite set of elements U — the semantic universe for all
functions and predicates of signature Σ — we deﬁne models that are partial
in that they have access to a part of Σ and U only.
Definition 2.1 [Partial models] A partial model Mv for (Σ,U) consists of
(i) a signature Σv = (Xv,Fv,Pv) such that Xv ⊆ X , Fv ⊆ F , and Pv ⊆ P;
(ii) a nonempty set of elements Uv with Uv ⊆ U ;
(iii) for all f ∈ Xv, a (total) function f v:Unv → Uv; and
(iv) for all P ∈ Pv, a relation P v ⊆ Unv .
The parameter v in Mv indicates that this model is a particular “view” of
models of sort Σ. Such views may be partial, for some of the inclusions for
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sorts (e.g. Xv ⊆ X ) can be strict. We point out that diﬀerent views may well
have the same signature, making inconsistencies a deﬁnite possibility. Also
observe that Uv may be a strict subset of U , e.g. the set of all even natural
numbers below 100, where U is the set of all natural numbers below 100.
3 Semantics of views
Smyth powerdomain
We deﬁne a semantics of partial models that conservatively extends the
usual semantics for ﬁrst-order logic. In doing so, we employ the Smyth power
domain [1], thereby rediscovering Kleene’s strong three-valued interpretation
of (propositional) logic [19].
Definition 3.1 [Smyth powerdomain functor [28,1]]
(i) For a ﬁnite partial order (P, ≤ ), the Smyth powerdomain of P , Ps(P ),
is the collection of all nonempty upper sets 4 of P , ordered by reverse
inclusion:
U1  U2 in Ps(P ) iﬀ U2 ⊆ U1.(3)
(ii) For a monotone function f :P → Q between ﬁnite partial orders, we
deﬁne the (total) function Ps(f):Ps(P )→ Ps(Q) as
Ps(f)(U)
def
= {q ∈ Q | for some u ∈ U , f(u) ≤ q}.(4)
Remark 3.2 [Universal property of Ps(·)] Ps(·) is a functor on the category
of ﬁnite partial orders and monotone functions. For any ﬁnite partial order
P , the ﬁnite partial order Ps(P ) is universal in the following sense: Let Q be
any ﬁnite partial order, f :P → Q any monotone function, and P :P → Ps(P )
deﬁned by P (p)
def
= {p′ ∈ P | p ≤ p′}. Then there exists a unique monotone
function f¯ :Ps(P )→ Q such that
f = f¯ ◦ P and f¯(U1 ∪ U2) = f¯(U1) ∪ f¯(U2) for all U1, U2 ∈ Ps(P ).(5)
In particular, Ps(f) equals Q ◦ f .
Example 3.3 (i) For the discrete partial order B
def
= {F, T}, the Smyth power
domain Ps(B) has three elements
{F, T}, {F}, and {T},(6)
where the ﬁrst one is the least element and the other two are maximal
elements. Note that Ps(B) is isomorphic to Ps(Ps(B)).
(ii) For a ﬁnite set Uv, the Smyth power domain Ps(Uv) consists of all nonempty
subsets of Uv ordered under reverse inclusion. In particular, the least ele-
ment of Ps(Uv) is Uv, and its maximal elements are all singleton sets {u}
(u ∈ Uv).
4 An upper set of P is a subset U of P such that x ∈ U and x ≤ y imply y ∈ U .
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(iii) If the function =B:B× B → B encodes classical equality of truth values,
then Ps(=
B) is a conservative extension of =B from B to Ps(B) which
returns U iﬀ at least one of its arguments equals U.
Definition 3.4 [Propositional logic on Ps(B)] Let ¬B, ∧B, and
∨
B be the
standard interpretations of negation, conjunction, and nary disjunction on B.
We deﬁne the monotone functions 5
¬s def= Ps(¬B) ∧s def= Ps(∧B)
s∨
def
= Ps(
B∨
)(7)
as our interpretation of propositional logic on Ps(B).
This categorical semantics turns out to be Kleene’s strong interpretation of
three-valued propositional logic [19]. We write U (“unknown”) for the set
{F, T} and identify T with {T} and F with {F} whenever this causes no confu-
sion.
Proposition 3.5 (Characterization of propositional logic in Ps(B)) (i)
The function ¬s maps T to F, F to T, and U to U.
(ii) The function x∧sy returns F if x or y equals F; otherwise, if x or y equals
U, it returns U; otherwise, it returns T.
(iii) The expression
∨s
j xj returns T if xj equals T for some j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n;
otherwise, it returns U if xj′ equals U for some j
′ with 1 ≤ j ′ ≤ n;
otherwise, it returns F.
Proof. Most of this follows from the universal property of the Smyth power-
domain. We show some cases for sake of illustration.
(i) The set ¬s({F, T}) equals all the elements in B that are greater than or
equal to ¬B(F) or ¬B(T). Thus, this set is {F, T}.
(ii) The set {F, T} ∧s {T} equals {F ∧B T, T ∧B T}, which is {F, T}.
(iii) Let xi0 = {F, T} and xi = {T} for all i = i0. Then
∨s xi equals {F, T}: we
obtain F by choosing F from each xi, including xi0 ; we get T by choosing
T from xi0 .
✷
Semantics of global terms
For a partial model Mv as in Deﬁnition 2.1, we deﬁne a semantics [| t |]vρ
as an element of Ps(Uv) for terms t of the global signature Σ, where ρ is a
local environment — a partial function from Xv to Uv that binds variables to
5 These functions are well deﬁned since any function on the discrete set B is monotone.
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concrete elements. For variables x ∈ X , we deﬁne 6
[| x |]vρ def=

 {ρ(x)} if x ∈ XvUv otherwise.(8)
Thus, we model the fact that the name x is not known in this view by eval-
uating it to “possibly any element in this view”. For function symbols, we
proceed similarly:
[| f(t1, . . . , tn) |]vρ def=

 {f
v(u1, . . . , un) | ui ∈ [| ti |]vρ} if f ∈ Fv
Uv otherwise.
(9)
If f ∈ Fv, then the semantics of f(t1, . . . , tn) in (9) is obtained by applying
Ps(·) to the interpretation f v of type Unv → Uv in the partial model. Otherwise,
we interpret f as a constant function whose image is the least element of
Ps(Uv).
Example 3.6 Let Uv be the set of even natural numbers below 100, including
zero. Suppose that +v and ∗v denote the usual operations of addition and
multiplication (respectively), except that they are executed “modulo 100”
(e.g. ∗v(46, 78) = 24 and ∗v(78, 0) = 0). Let x ∈ Xv. Then [| +(6, x) |]vρ equals
{6 + u (mod 100) | u ∈ Uv}, which is Uv; whereas [| ∗(0, x) |]vρ equals {0}.
Semantics of global formulas
The meaning of a global formula is an element of the Smyth power domain
Ps(B) of B: it is T, if the formula is deﬁnitely true; F if the formula is deﬁnitely
false; and U if the truth value of the formula cannot be determined, due to the
partiality of the model. Clearly,
[|  |]vρ def= T.(10)
Since the meaning of a partial term is a nonempty subset of the local universe
of semantic elements, we need to lift the relations that interpret predicate
symbols to subsets:
[| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]vρ def=


T if P ∈ Pv & [
∏
i [| ti |]vρ ⊆ P v]
F if P ∈ Pv & [
∏
i [| ti |]vρ ∩ P v = ∅]
U otherwise.
(11)
Note that the side conditions in (11) can be checked by automated theo-
rem provers, e.g. SVC or PVS, if the sets [| ti |]vρ and P v can be expressed as
quantiﬁer-free formulas of ﬁrst-order logic. In particular, such checks may
allow the evaluation of properties over infinite partial models. If P ∈ Pv,
6 In computing [| t |]vρ and [| φ |]vρ, we make the standard assumption that ρ is deﬁned for all
free variables of t and φ that are contained in Xv.
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then (11) computes Ps(P
v), where we identify the relation P v with its char-
acteristic function of type Unv → B. The interpretation of the remaining
connectives uses our propositional logic on Ps(B):
[| ¬φ |]vρ def= ¬s[| φ |]vρ(12)
[| φ1 ∧ φ2 |]vρ def= [| φ1 |]vρ ∧s [| φ2 |]vρ(13)
[| ∃xφ |]vρ def=
s∨
u∈Uv
[| φ |]vρ[x→u],(14)
where ρ[x → u] contains the same bindings as ρ, except that it binds x to u.
In (14), it does not matter whether x is in Xv since ∃x binds the name x and
thereby makes it “locally known” by extending the current environment ρ.
Example 3.7 Revisiting Example 3.6, let >v be the standard interpretation
“strictly greater than” of > on Uv. The formula (6 + x) > 4 evaluates to U
and the formula (0 ∗ x) > 2 evaluates to F. The reason for the former is that
in (11) some instances of P v(u1, . . . , un) hold (e.g. (6 + 0) >
v 4), but not all
of them (e.g. not (6 + 98) >v 4).
We show that our semantics for partial models coincides with the standard
semantics of ﬁrst-order logic for all “complete” partial models, which are un-
derstood to be those partial models Mv, where Σv equals Σ. That is, these
are just the ordinary models of ﬁrst-order logic for the signature Σ.
Proposition 3.8 (Conservative extension of first-order logic) LetMv
be a partial model for (Σ,U) such that Σv = Σ. For all φ and ρ, the set [| φ |]vρ
is a singleton {d}, where d ∈ {T, F}. Moreover, the truth value d coincides
with the usual first-order logic semantics of φ in the model Mv. 7
Proof.
• Since Σv = Σ, a structural induction on t shows that [| t |]vρ is a singleton and
that its sole element is the standard denotation of term t in environment ρ
of model Mv.
• Since all sets [| t |]vρ are singletons, (11) entails that [| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]vρ cannot
be U. From (11) and the fact that the truth value it contains matches the
standard ﬁrst-order semantics, this match holds for all atomic formulas.
• Finally, the functions ¬s, ∧s, and ∨s all restrict to the set
{{T}, {F}}(15)
of maximal elements of Ps(B); on that set they coincide with the standard
semantics of negation, conjunction, and nary disjunction: ¬B, ∧B, and ∨B
(respectively).
✷
7 I.e. d = T iﬀ Mv |= φ holds for the standard satisfaction relation |= of ﬁrst-order logic.
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4 Refinement of views
One partial view can be a reﬁnement of another partial view. Intuitively, this
means that the reﬁning view encodes more precise knowledge of a software
system without contradicting the knowledge of the reﬁned view. We say that
a semantics of partial views is sound with respect to reﬁnement if it supports
this property of the reﬁnement relation. In Deﬁnition 4.1 we formalize the
idea that the reﬁning view encodes more precise knowledge of the software
system in question. In Proposition 4.5 below we show that the reﬁning view
does not contradict the knowledge of the reﬁned view if the domains of se-
mantic elements of the two views are the same and, thus, establish that our
semantics is sound with respect to the reﬁnement relation under the speciﬁed
circumstances.
Definition 4.1 [Reﬁnement of partial models] Let Mv1 and Mv2 be two
partial models for (Σ,U) with signatures Σv1 = (Xv1 ,Fv1 ,Pv1) and Σv2 =
(Xv2 ,Fv2 ,Pv2) (respectively). Then Mv1 refines Mv2 , denoted by Mv1 
Mv2 , iﬀ
(i) the signature and universe of Mv1 extend those of Mv2 : Xv2 ⊆ Xv1 ,
Fv2 ⊆ Fv1 , Pv2 ⊆ Pv1 , and Uv2 ⊆ Uv1 ; and
(ii) Mv1 conservatively extends the semantics of functions and predicates
that are in the signature of Mv2 :
f ∈ Fv2 , ui ∈ Uv2 ⇒ f v2(u1, . . . , un) = f v1(u1, . . . , un)(16)
P ∈ Pv2 , ui ∈ Uv2 ⇒ (u1, . . . , un) ∈ P v2 iﬀ (u1, . . . , un) ∈ P v1 .(17)
Example 4.2 The partial modelMv from Example 3.6 is reﬁned by the par-
tial model Mv′ , where Σv′ equals Σv, Uv′ is the set of all natural numbers
below 100, and +v
′
and ∗v′ are the interpretations of addition and multipli-
cation “modulo 100” (respectively). We can further reﬁne Mv′ to Mv′′ by
making x an element of Xv′′ .
Lemma 4.3 The relation  is a preorder on the set of all partial models for
Σ.
Proof. For sake of illustration, we only show the transitivity of condition
(16). Let Mv1  Mv2 and Mv2  Mv3 . Given f ∈ Fv3 and ui ∈ Uv3 , we
infer (i) ui ∈ Uv2 , (ii) f ∈ Fv2 , and (iii) f v3(u1, . . . , un) = f v2(u1, . . . , un) from
Mv2  Mv3 . But then Mv1  Mv2 and (i)–(iii) imply f v2(u1, . . . , un) =
f v1(u1, . . . , un), and so f
v3(u1, . . . , un) = f
v1(u1, . . . , un) follows. ✷
Example 4.4 [Unsound semantics] Our semantics is not sound in the sense
that Mv1  Mv2 does not imply [| φ |]v2ρ  [| φ |]v1ρ for all φ. The latter is a
way of expressing the requirement that v1 has more precise knowledge of the
software system than v2, but that this knowledge is consistent with that of v2.
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In Example 4.2, we saw thatMv is reﬁned by the modelMv′′ . The formula 8
∃x (98 < x)(18)
evaluates to F in Mv since 98 is the maximal element of Uv, but it evaluates
to T in the reﬁning model Mv′′ since it has 99 as a witness. Note that this
could only happen because Mv had a somewhat limited view of the natural
numbers contained in the interval [0, 99].
Naturally, this unsoundness is a good thing as it allows us to detect incon-
sistencies between these views even without having any policies regarding the
priorities of these views. However, one can prove the soundness of our seman-
tics if all views share the same set of elements U . Then the sets [| t |]vρ and
[| φ |]vρ computed by a partial modelMv are sound approximations (supersets)
of the corresponding sets computed by partial models that reﬁne Mv.
Proposition 4.5 (Soundness of semantics) Let Mvi be partial models for
(Σ,U) with signatures Σvi (i = 1, 2) such that Mv1  Mv2 and Uv1 = Uv2.
Let ρ be an environment for Mv2.
(i) For all terms t over Σ, [| t |]v2ρ  [| t |]v1ρ in Ps(Uv2).
(ii) For all formulas φ over Σ, [| φ |]v2ρ  [| φ |]v1ρ in Ps(B).
Proof. Since Xv2 ⊆ Xv1 and Uv2 ⊆ Uv1 , we conclude that ρ can be cast to an
environment for Mv1 as well.
(i) We consider variables x:
• If x ∈ Xv1 , then x ∈ Xv2 as well, and so [| x |]v2ρ = Uv2 = [| x |]v1ρ .
• If x ∈ Xv1 , then [| x |]v1ρ equals {ρ(x)} which is contained in Uv2 . But
[| x |]v2ρ can only equal {ρ(x)} or Uv2 .
(ii) As for general terms t:
• If f ∈ Fv1 , then f ∈ Fv2 as well, and so [| f(t1, . . . , tn |]v2ρ = Uv2 =
[| f(t1, . . . , tn) |]v1ρ , since Uv1 = Uv2 .
• If f ∈ Fv1 , we have two cases. First, if f ∈ Fv2 , then (16) and Uv1 = Uv2
imply that the functions f v1 and f v1 are identical. Thus,
[| f(t1, . . . , tn) |]v2ρ = {f v2(u1, . . . , un) | ui ∈ [| ti |]v2ρ }
⊇{f v2(u1, . . . , un) | ui ∈ [| ti |]v1ρ } by ind.
= {f v1(u1, . . . , un) | ui ∈ [| ti |]v1ρ } as Mv1 Mv2
= [| f(t1, . . . , tn) |]v1ρ .(19)
Second, if f ∈ Fv2 , then [| f(t1, . . . , tn) |]v2ρ = Uv2 is the least element of
Ps(Uv2), so there is nothing to show.
(iii) For formulas, the statement is clear for .
(iv) Consider P (t1, . . . , tn).
8 As customary, we identify natural numbers with their corresponding constants in the
logic.
182
Huth and Pradhan
• If P ∈ Pv1 , then P ∈ Pv2 as well, and so [| P (t1, . . . , tn |]v2ρ = U =
[| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]v1ρ .
• If P ∈ Pv1 , we have two cases.
· If P ∈ Pv2 , then (17) and Uv1 = Uv2 imply that the relations P v1
and P v1 are identical. Assume that [| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]v2ρ = T. Inspect-
ing (11) and noting that the [| ti |]v2ρ are supersets of [| ti |]v1ρ , this implies
[| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]v1ρ = T as well. Similarly, from these inclusions and (11)
we infer that [| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]v2ρ equals F whenever [| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]v2ρ =
F. Finally, if [| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]v2ρ = U, there is nothing to show.
· If P ∈ Pv2 , then [| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]v2ρ = U, so there is nothing to show.
(v) For the remaining connectives ¬, ∧, and ∃x we use induction and the
fact that the corresponding operations ¬s, ∧s, and ∨s are monotone on
Ps(B).
✷
5 View semantics as consensus
As the semantics [| φ |]vρ is three-valued it might seem as if it cannot be com-
puted using the techniques of standard ﬁrst-order logic. However, we show
below how the semantics [| φ |]vρ can be computed in such a standard man-
ner. This is accomplished by splitting this semantics into two two-valued
ones whose consensus recovers the original semantics. This method has al-
ready been applied successfully by Bruns & Godefroid in [2] for partial Kripke
structures and in [8] for modal transition systems in the context of model
checking partial state spaces. 9 Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne two functions Opts and
Pesss of type Ps(B)→ Ps(B) by
Pesss(x)
def
=
B∧
x Opts(x)
def
=
B∨
x.(20)
Note that these functions leave T and F ﬁxed, but promote U to a proper truth
value:
Pesss(U) = F Opts(U) = T.(21)
These functions are used to cast U values, arising from the evaluation of atomic
formulas P (t1, . . . , tn), to proper truth values; their duality is expressed in the
equations
Pesss = ¬s ◦Opts ◦ ¬s Opts = ¬s ◦ Pesss ◦ ¬s.(22)
Thus, we arrive at two semantics deﬁned in Figure 1. Following Kelb [18],
the treatment of negation switches the mode of evaluation from o(v) to p(v)
or vice versa. We now show that [| · |]vρ can be reconstructed from [| · |]o(v)ρ and
[| · |]p(v)ρ with set-theoretic union as a “consensus operator”.
9 Our results can be redeveloped for a ﬁrst-order logic extended with a transitive-closure
operator, a crucial extension of ﬁrst-order logic to a realistic speciﬁcation language.
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[| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]o(v)ρ def=Optv([| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]vρ)
[| ¬φ |]o(v)ρ def=¬s[| φ |]p(v)ρ
[| φ1 ∧ φ2 |]o(v)ρ def= [| φ1 |]o(v)ρ ∧s [| φ2 |]o(v)ρ
[| ∃xφ |]o(v)ρ def=
s∨
u∈U
[| φ |]o(v)ρ[x→u]
[| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]p(v)ρ def=Pessv([| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]vρ)
[| ¬φ |]p(v)ρ def=¬s[| φ |]o(v)ρ
[| φ1 ∧ φ2 |]p(v)ρ def= [| φ1 |]p(v)ρ ∧s [| φ2 |]p(v)ρ
[| ∃xφ |]p(v)ρ def=
s∨
u∈U
[| φ |]p(v)ρ[x→u].
Fig. 1. Optimistic and pessimistic denotational semantics for first-order logic for-
mulas in environment ρ and partial modelMv.
Proposition 5.1 (Kleene’s alignment operator [19]) Kleene’s alignment
operation may be defined as a function of type Ps(B)×Ps(B)→ Ps(B): for an
input pair (x, y) it returns x in case that x equals y; otherwise, it returns U.
This function is simply the binary union operator
∪ :Ps(B)× Ps(B)→ Ps(B).(23)
Proof. We have {T} ∪ {T} = {T} and {F} ∪ {F} = {F}. But x ∪ y equals
{F, T} whenever the set x is diﬀerent from the set y in Ps(B). ✷
The reconstruction of [| · |]vρ as a consensus of [| · |]p(v)ρ and [| · |]o(v)ρ requires that
we prove the consistency of [| · |]p(v)ρ . The optimistic semantics [| · |]o(v)ρ , how-
ever, cannot oﬀer such a consistency for a partial model Mv in general, since
[| · |]o(v)ρ records what kind of properties may hold for complete models that
reﬁne Mv: it is often the case that there exist such reﬁning models Mv′ and
Mv′′ , where [| φ |]o(v
′)
ρ = T and [| ¬φ |]o(v′′)ρ = T, resulting in [| φ ∧ ¬φ |]o(v)ρ = T. 10
In this context, it is useful to think of [| φ |]p(v)ρ = T as an underapproximation
of “φ holds in all complete models that reﬁne Mv, but retain Uv”, whereas
[| φ |]o(v)ρ = T is an overapproximation of “φ holds in some complete models
that reﬁnes Mv, but retains Uv”.
Theorem 5.2 (Consistency of [| · |]p(v)ρ ) Let Mv be a partial model, φ a
global formula, and ρ a local environment. Then
[| φ ∧ ¬φ |]p(v)ρ = F.(24)
10 This is the price we pay for deﬁning the meaning of ∧ (∨) via ∧s (∨s) for p(v) (o(v)).
One could conceivably use the ideas of [3] to improve on this.
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Proof. By structural induction on φ. By deﬁnition, it suﬃces to show that
[| φ |]p(v)ρ ∧s ¬s[| φ |]o(v)ρ = F. Throughout the proof, we use that [| φ |]p(v)ρ and
[| φ |]o(v)ρ always compute a value in B.
• We compute [|  |]p(v)ρ ∧s ¬s[|  |]o(v)ρ = T ∧s ¬sT = F.
• For atomic formulas, [| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]p(v)ρ ∧s ¬s[| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]o(v)ρ equals
Pesss(x) ∧s ¬sOpts(x)(25)
where x equals [| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]vρ. But the conjunction in (25) cannot return
U since its arguments are diﬀerent from U. This conjunction can also not
evaluate to T, for then both conjuncts evaluate to T, forcing x to be T and
F at the same time.
• For negated formulas, we compute
[| ¬φ′ |]p(v)ρ ∧s ¬s[| ¬φ′ |]o(v)ρ =¬s[| ¬φ′ |]o(v)ρ ∧s [| ¬φ′ |]p(v)ρ ∧s comm.
=¬s¬s[| φ′ |]p(v)ρ ∧s ¬s[| φ′ |]o(v)ρ sem. of ¬
= [| φ′ |]p(v)ρ ∧s ¬s[| φ′ |]o(v)ρ ¬s idemp.
= F by ind.(26)
• For conjunctions, the expression
[| φ1 ∧ φ2 |]p(v)ρ ∧s ¬s[| φ1 ∧ φ2 |]o(v)ρ(27)
cannot be U. Assuming that it is T, we infer that both conjuncts are T.
Thus [| φi |]p(v)ρ = T for i = 1, 2 and [| φ1 ∧ φ2 |]o(v)ρ = F. Without loss of
generality, [| φ2 |]o(v)ρ = F follows, and so [| ¬φ2 |]p(v)ρ = T. Thus, we arrive at
[| φ2 ∧ ¬φ2 |]p(v)ρ = T, contradicting the induction hypothesis.
• For existential formulas, the expression
[| ∃xφ |]p(v)ρ ∧s ¬s[| ∃xφ |]o(v)ρ(28)
cannot be U. Assuming that it is T, we infer that both conjuncts are T.
Thus
s∨
u∈Uv
[| φ |]p(v)ρ[x→u] = T(29)
s∨
u∈Uv
[| φ |]o(v)ρ[x→u] = F.(30)
From the ﬁrst equation we infer [| φ |]p(v)ρ[x→u′] = T for some u′ ∈ Uv. From the
second equation, we conclude that [| φ |]o(v)ρ[x→u′] = F, rendering [| ¬φ |]p(v)ρ[x→u′] =
T, and so [| φ ∧ ¬φ |]p(v)ρ[x→u′] = T, contradicting the induction hypothesis
(which is quantiﬁed over all local environments).
✷
Corollary 5.3 (Consistency in entailment form) For all partial models
Mv, global formulas φ, and local environments ρ, we have
[| φ |]p(v)ρ = T ⇒ [| φ |]o(v)ρ = T.(31)
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Proof. Proof by contradiction: If [| φ |]p(v)ρ = T and [| φ |]o(v)ρ = F, then ¬s[| φ |]o(v)ρ
equals T, i.e. [| ¬φ |]p(v)ρ = T, and so [| φ ∧ ¬φ |]p(v)ρ = T follows, contradicting
Theorem 5.2. ✷
It is rather obvious that Corollary 5.3 also implies Theorem 5.2, so these
assertions are equivalent.
Theorem 5.4 (Semantics of consensus) Let Mv be a partial model. For
all global formulas φ and local environments ρ we have
[| φ |]vρ = [| φ |]p(v)ρ ∪ [| φ |]o(v)ρ .(32)
The proof of (32) requires several lemmas.
Lemma 5.5 (Distributivity of negation) For all x, y ∈ Ps(B), we have
¬s(x ∪ y) = ¬sx ∪ ¬sy.(33)
Proof. Since ¬s is a bijection, we have x = y iﬀ ¬sx = ¬sy, so the LHS
of (33) equals U iﬀ its RHS equals U. Otherwise, both sides evaluate to ¬sx.✷
Lemma 5.6 (Consistent distributivity of conjunction) Let a, b, x, y ∈
Ps(B) \ {U}. If a = T implies b = T and if x = T implies y = T, then
(a ∪ b) ∧s (x ∪ y) = (a ∧s x) ∪ (b ∧s y).(34)
Proof.
(i) Assume that the LHS of (34) is F. Then a ∪ b or x ∪ y evaluate to F.
(a) If a∪ b evaluates to F, then a and b equal F, and so a∧s x and b∧s y
evaluate to F. Therefore, the RHS of (34) evaluates to F as well.
(b) If x ∪ y evaluates to F, we reason symmetrically.
(ii) Assume that the LHS is T. Then a ∪ b and x ∪ y evaluate to T. Thus, a,
b, x, and y all evaluate to T. Therefore, the RHS of (34) evaluates to T
as well.
(iii) Assume that the LHS evaluates to U. Then a ∪ b or x ∪ y evaluates to U.
(a) If the RHS computes to F, we derive a contradiction:
First, if a ∪ b evaluates to U, then a = b and x ∪ y = F; the latter
because the LHS equals U. But a = b implies a = T by assumption
of the lemma. Thus, a equals F and so b equals T. Since the RHS
equals F, we infer y = F from b = T. By assumption of the lemma,
y = F implies x = F, contradicting x ∪ y = F.
Second, if x ∪ y evaluates to U, we argue symmetrically.
(b) If the RHS computes to T, then a ∧s x and b ∧s y evaluate to T. But
then a, b, x, and y evaluate to T. Thus, the LHS computes to T, a
contradiction.
✷
Lemma 5.7 (Consistent distributivity of disjunction) Given two fam-
ilies (xi)i∈I and (yi)i∈I in Ps(B) \ {U} such that xi = T implies yi = T for all
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i ∈ I, we have
s∨
(xi ∪ yi) =
(
s∨
xi
)
∪
(
s∨
yi
)
.(35)
Proof.
(i) If the LHS of (35) is T, then xi0∪yi0 = T for some i0 ∈ I, so xi0 = yi0 = T.
The former implies
∨s xi = T, the latter implies ∨s yi = T. Therefore,
the RHS of (35) computes to T as well.
(ii) If the LHS of (35) is F, then xi ∪ yi = F for all i ∈ I, so xi = yi = F
for all i ∈ I. The former implies ∨s xi = F, the latter implies ∨s yi = F.
Therefore, the RHS of (35) computes to F as well.
(iii) If the LHS of (35) is U, then there is some i0 ∈ I with xi0 ∪ yi0 = U, and
for all i ∈ I, we have xi ∪ yi = T.
(a) Assume that the RHS of (34) equals F. Then
∨s xi and ∨s yi equals
F, meaning that all xi and yi are F, contradicting xi0 ∪ yi0 = U.
(b) Assume that the RHS of (34) equals T. Then
∨s xi and ∨s yi equals
T, meaning that there exist i1, i2 ∈ I with xi1 = T and yi2 = T. But
xi1 = T implies yi1 = T, and so xi1 ∪ yi1 = T implies that the LHS
equals T, a contradiction.
✷
Proof of Theorem 5.4
By structural induction on φ:
• We have [|  |]vρ = {T} = {T} ∪ {T} = [|  |]p(v)ρ ∪ [|  |]o(v)ρ .
• For atomic formulas, we compute [| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]p(v)ρ ∪[| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]o(v)ρ =
Pesss(x)∪Opts(x), where x equals [| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]vρ. But in Ps(B), we have
the equation
Pesss(x) ∪Opts(x) = x.(36)
• For negated formulas, we use induction, Lemma 5.5, and the commutativity
of ∪.
• For conjunctions, we use induction, Corollary 5.3, and Lemma 5.6.
• For existential formulas, we use induction, Corollary 5.3, and Lemma 5.7.
As remarked earlier [| · |]p(v)ρ is consistent, whereas this is not true for [| · |]o(v)ρ
in general. For complete models, however, it turns out that these semantics
agree.
Proposition 5.8 (Semantics of complete models) Let Mv be a partial
model for (Σ,U) with Σv = Σ. Then [| φ |]p(v)ρ = [| φ |]o(v)ρ for all global formulas
φ and local environments ρ.
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Proof. We already remarked that [| φ |]vρ ∈ Ps(B) \ {U} holds for complete
models. But then Theorem 5.4 implies that [| φ |]p(v)ρ is equal to [| φ |]o(v)ρ . ✷
6 Model-checking [| · |]vρ
We now show that the computation of [| · |]vρ, [| · |]p(v)ρ , and [| · |]o(v)ρ can be re-
duced to the usual model-checking of models of ﬁrst-order logic. One may
then approximate such standard checks with the techniques of abstract inter-
pretation [5].
6.1 Expressive power of [| · |]p(v)ρ and [| · |]o(v)ρ
The results shown in previous sections entail that we may compute [| φ |]vρ via
[| · |]p(v)ρ or [| · |]o(v)ρ only. Thus, it suﬃces to implement a model checker for any
of these semantics.
Theorem 6.1 (A first reduction of [| · |]vρ) Let Mv be a partial model for
(Σ,U), φ a global formula, and ρ a local environment. Then
[| φ |]vρ= [| φ |]p(v)ρ ∪ ¬s[| ¬φ |]p(v)ρ(37)
[| φ |]vρ= [| φ |]o(v)ρ ∪ ¬s[| ¬φ |]o(v)ρ .(38)
Proof. Because of the semantics of ¬ and the idempotency of ¬s, these equa-
tions are equivalent. For the same reasons the ﬁrst equation follows from (32).
✷
6.2 Negation normal forms for model checks
We decomposed the semantics of [| φ |]vρ into the consensus of a pessimistic and
an optimistic semantics in order to avoid having to deploy a three-valued model
checker. Our goal is to (re)use conventional ﬁrst-order model checkers to the
extent possible to verify arbitrary ﬁrst-order formulas over partial views. How-
ever, the treatment of negation makes the pessimistic and optimistic model
checkers mutually dependent, preventing the use of standard tools for ﬁrst-
order-logic model checking. We can avoid this limitation by transforming φ
to its negation normal form. Similarly to [2,8], this then moves the optimistic
and pessimistic interpretations into the phase of model construction.
In presenting ﬁrst-order logic, we assumed that ∨, →, and ∀x are derived
syntactic notions. This assumption was intuitively justiﬁed by the familiar
semantic DeMorgan laws for ﬁrst-order logic. For each signature Σ and each
φ of our logic, we now use these laws to compute the standard negation normal
form T (φ), an element generated by the grammar
L ::=P (t, t, . . . , t) | ¬P (t, t, . . . , t) // Literals
φ ::=⊥ |  | L | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | ∃xφ | ∀xφ.(39)
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We specify this translation φ→ T (φ), where the domain of this translation is
all expressions of (1) and the range is all expressions of (39), via (contextual)
rewrite rules:
❀  P (t, . . . , t)❀ P (t, . . . , t)
φ ∧ φ❀ φ ∧ φ ∃xφ❀ ∃xφ
¬❀ ⊥ ¬P (t, . . . , t)❀ ¬P (t, . . . , t)
¬¬φ❀ φ ¬(φ ∧ φ)❀ ¬φ ∨ ¬φ
¬∃xφ❀ ∀x¬φ.
Example 6.2 For φ being ¬[∃y (¬(y = 0) ∧ ¬(∃x [x < y + 1]))], we compute
T (φ) to be
∀y [(y = 0) ∨ ∃x (x < y + 1)].(40)
The denotational semantics for formulas T (φ) is given in Figure 2. The func-
tion ∨s is the binary version of ∨s. The semantics for ∀x, the function ∧s,
has the same type as
∨s and is deﬁned as
s∧
def
= ¬s ◦
s∨
◦
∏
¬s.(41)
Notice that the semantics [| · |]n(v)ρ always computes over Ps(B) \ {U} only, ex-
cept for the evaluation of [| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]vρ in the clauses for P (t1, . . . , tn) and
¬P (t1, . . . , tn); such values get immediately lifted to proper truth values by
means of Pesss and ¬sOpts (respectively). 11 Observe that if [| φ |]vρ = U
then [| ¬φ |]vρ should also evaluate to U, which is guaranteed by deﬁning it as
¬s[| φ |]vρ = ¬sU = U. So what we want in the deﬁnition of [| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]n(v)ρ and
[| ¬P (t1, . . . , tn) |]n(v)ρ is that when [| φ |]vρ = U,
[| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]n(v)ρ = [| ¬P (t1, . . . , tn) |]n(v)ρ
This requires us to deﬁne [| ¬P (t1, . . . , tn) |]n(v)ρ in the manner given in Fig. 2.
We can show the adequacy of this semantics.
Theorem 6.3 (A second reduction of [| · |]vρ) Let Mv be a partial model
for Σ, φ a global formula, and ρ a local environment. Then
[| φ |]p(v)ρ = [| T (φ) |]n(v)ρ .(42)
Proof. By structural induction on φ. The cases where φ is not of the form
¬φ′ follow directly by induction, given the rewrite rules for such formulas. Let
φ be ¬φ′.
• If φ′ equals , then [| ¬ |]p(v)ρ = ¬sT = F = [| ⊥ |]n(v)ρ = [| T (¬) |]n(v)ρ .
11 Also notice that [| ¬P (t1, . . . , tn) |]n(v)ρ is not deﬁned as ¬s[| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]n(v)ρ , in contrast
to [| ¬φ |]vρ which is deﬁned as ¬s[| φ |]vρ.
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[| ⊥ |]n(v)ρ def= F
[|  |]n(v)ρ def= T
[| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]n(v)ρ def=Pesss([| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]vρ)
[| ¬P (t1, . . . , tn) |]n(v)ρ def=¬sOpts([| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]vρ)
[| φ1 ∧ φ2 |]n(v)ρ def= [| φ1 |]n(v)ρ ∧s [| φ2 |]n(v)ρ
[| φ1 ∨ φ2 |]n(v)ρ def= [| φ1 |]n(v)ρ ∨s [| φ2 |]n(v)ρ
[| ∃xφ |]n(v)ρ def=
s∨
u∈Uv
[| φ |]n(v)ρ[x→u]
[| ∀xφ |]n(v)ρ def=
s∧
u∈Uv
[| φ |]n(v)ρ[x→u].
Fig. 2. Denotational semantics for first-order logic formulas in negation normal
form, evaluated in environment ρ and partial modelMv.
• If φ′ equals P (t1, . . . , tn), then
[| ¬P (t1, . . . , Pn) |]p(v)ρ =¬s[| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]o(v)ρ
=¬sOpts([| P (t1, . . . , tn) |]vρ)
= [| T (¬P (t1, . . . , tn)) |]n(v)ρ .
• If φ′ equals φ1 ∧ φ2, then
[| ¬(φ1 ∧ φ2) |]p(v)ρ =¬s[| φ1 ∧ φ2 |]o(v)ρ
=¬s([| φ1 |]o(v)ρ ∧s [| φ2 |]o(v)ρ )
=¬s[| φ1 |]o(v)ρ ∨s ¬s[| φ2 |]o(v)ρ sem. law
= [| ¬φ1 |]p(v)ρ ∨s [| ¬φ2 |]p(v)ρ
= [| T (¬φ1) |]n(v)ρ ∨s [| T (¬φ2) |]n(v)ρ by ind.
= [| T (¬(φ1 ∧ φ2)) |]n(v)ρ rewrite rule.(43)
• Finally, if φ′ is of the form ∃xφ′′, then
[| ¬∃xφ′′ |]p(v)ρ =¬s[| ∃xφ′′ |]o(v)ρ
=¬s
s∨
u∈Uv
[| φ′′ |]o(v)ρ[x→u]
=¬s
s∨
u∈Uv
¬s¬s[| φ′′ |]o(v)ρ[x→u] ¬s idemp.
=
s∧
u∈Uv
¬s[| φ′′ |]o(v)ρ[x→u] def. of
∧s
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=
s∧
u∈Uv
[| ¬φ′′ |]p(v)ρ[x→u]
=
s∧
u∈Uv
[| T (¬φ′′) |]n(v)ρ[x→u] by ind.
= [| ∀xT (¬φ′′)) |]n(v)ρ[x→u]
= [| T (¬∃xφ′′) |]n(v)ρ[x→u] rewrite rule.(44)
✷
6.3 Model construction
We emphasize the signiﬁcance of Theorem 6.3. In order to compute [| φ |]p(v)ρ
over a partial modelMv for Σ, we may instead perform a conventional model
check for a standard model Mnv of ﬁrst-order logic. This model is obtained
from the partial model Mv by (i) extending its signature Σ with complemen-
tary predicate symbols P for each P ∈ Pv; and by (ii) letting the interpreta-
tions P vn and P
v
n be nary relations over Ps(Uv). For u1, . . . , un ∈ Ps(Uv), we
set
P vn
def
= {(u1, . . . , un) ∈
∏
Ps(Uv) | Pesss([| P (u1, . . . , un) |]vρ) = T}(45)
P
v
n
def
= {(u1, . . . , un) ∈
∏
Ps(Uv) | ¬sOpts([| P (u1, . . . , un) |]vρ) = T}.(46)
In (45) and (46), we extended the deﬁnition of [| · |]vρ to elements of Ps(Uv) by
setting [| u |]vρ def= u. The sets P vn and P vn are well deﬁned since the expressions
[| P (u1, . . . , un) |]vρ evaluate to the same truth value, independent of the choice
of ρ. Observe that the consistency of this model is represented by the fact
that
P vn ∩ P vn = ∅ (P ∈ P).(47)
This is guaranteed since Pesss(x) = T and Opts(x) = T imply x = T and x = F
(respectively). However,
P vn ∪ P vn = {(u1, . . . , un) ∈
∏
Ps(Uv) | [| P (u1, . . . , un) |]vρ = U}(48)
is diﬀerent from
∏
Ps(Uv) in general. Having constructed the model Mnv in
this manner, the semantics in Figure 2 can now be seen as a speciﬁcation
of a conventional ﬁrst-order-logic model checker for [| · |]p(v)ρ . In summary,
we have reduced our three-valued model-checking problem to two two-valued
model-checking problems of ordinary ﬁrst-order logic by adding complemen-
tary atomic predicates and by lifting their interpretations from the domain of
the original partial model to its Smyth powerdomain. The latter domain can
then be approximated with the techniques of abstract interpretation [5].
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7 Related work
In [2], G. Bruns and P. Godefroid develop a three-valued version of model-
checking models of computation tree logic (CTL). The models are similar to
conventional Kripke structures, except that state propositions can take on val-
ues T, F, or U. They have a notion of reﬁnement and show that their temporal
logic semantics is sound and complete with respect to this reﬁnement. With
each three-valued model they associate two Kripke structures, an optimistic
and a pessimistic one, allowing them to implement their three-valued model-
checking problem as two two-valued model-checking problems for CTL (over
Kripke structures). In [3], this work is being extended to generalized model
checking (GMC), improving the precision (and increasing the complexity) of
their initial semantics, and implementing GMC via (ﬁnite-state) automata on
inﬁnite words. 12
In [11,8], the contributions of [2] are redeveloped for (Kripke) modal tran-
sition systems (MTSs). In MTSs transitions may take on any value T, F, or
U — meaning that such transitions are guaranteed, impossible, and possible
(respectively) [21,20].
In [12], partial state-machines are modeled as MTSs and a multiple-view
semantics and its model checker are derived from the property semantics of
MTSs in [11].
In [6], Cousot & Cousot use two abstraction functions α∀ and α∃ for the
same concretization function of an abstract interpretation to systematically
derive a branching-time semantics from a linear trace semantics. Similar to
Pesss and Opts, the abstraction functions α∀ and α∃ are dual with respect to
complementation.
In program analysis, three-valued models of ﬁrst-order logic have been used
for the safe abstraction of “shape invariants” [27] and the veriﬁcation of safety
properties of Java programs [29].
Our viewsMv can be partial in that they may not have interpretations for
certain function or predicate symbols, but apart from that we assumed that
views have the same representation of a speciﬁcation. As D. Jackson points
out, this may not always be appropriate [13].
The tool xlinkit analyzes distributed XML documents for possible in-
consistencies, based on rules written in ﬁrst-order logic [23]. Our semantic
framework could possibly be used as a foundation for such a tool.
D. Jackson wrote the object modelling language Alloy [14] as a lightweight
tool for specifying relational models of software artifacts. Primitive types are
interpreted as ﬁnite sets without any algebraic structure. Models written in
Alloy can be automatically analyzed with the Alloy Constraint Analyzer (for-
merly known as “Alcoa” [15]) in two modes. First, one can check inconsistency
12 The precision of our semantics can be improved in the same manner as carried out in [3],
and it would be of interest to see whether such a semantics of ﬁrst-order logic could be
implemented with suitable (ﬁnite-state) automata.
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(= overspeciﬁcation) of multiple speciﬁcation components and their interac-
tion through the checking of invariants. Second, one can refute properties (=
underspeciﬁcation) by computing a counterexample to an assert statement.
Since the full language (ﬁrst-order relational logic with a transitive closure
operator) is undecidable, both modes run in a user-speciﬁed scope, the max-
imal size of primitive types. This approach is partial in that the inability of
generating a counterexample within a given scope means that the status of
inconsistency and property refutation is unknown (respectively).
S. Guerra [10] develops a framework for speciﬁcations of software artifacts,
where such speciﬁcations have defaults and allow for exceptions stemming
from the reuse or evolution of system demands. This framework is cast in
the machinery of institutions [9]. Speciﬁcations are written in linear-time
temporal logic [26] and a non-monotonic semantics for this logic is deﬁned
based on default institutions. A distance between interpretation morphisms
induces a preferential preorder between models that is used to deﬁne that
semantics. The signature is split into observable actions (where the distance
enforces consistency across models) and attributes (where the distance checks
for consistency across models).
M. Chechik and S. Easterbrook [7] merge multiple viewpoints of a software
system expressed as partial state-machines. Diﬀerent viewpoints need not
recognize the same vocabulary of observables. Their models are multi-valued
Kripke structure over a quasi-boolean lattice. Their semantics for the temporal
logic CTL evaluates a state and a formula to an element of the merged lattice.
VDM [16] is a model-based speciﬁcation language for software systems.
Unlike speciﬁcation languages such as Z, VDM allow for the speciﬁcation of
partial functions and its semantics is essentially Kleene’s strong interpretation
of propositional logic. Note that our framework assumes that functions are
total and that the only source of partiality resides in the “lack of knowledge”
of how to interpret certain function or predicate symbols.
In [22], J. M. Morris and A. Bunkenburg use a strong three-valued inter-
pretation of equality which — unlike Ps(=
B) from Example 3.3 — returns U
only if both its arguments are U. They combine this equational theory 13 with
a typed logic of partial functions (LPF [17]) to obtain a system for equational
reasoning in the presence of partial functions — the speciﬁcations of programs.
In [4] powerdomains are used to systematically derive the relational se-
mantics of the standard staple of database operations.
8 Conclusions
We generalized the standard notions of models and semantics of ﬁrst-order
logic to partial models that may not have any information about certain func-
tion symbols and predicate symbols at their disposal. At the model-theoretic
13 As they note, its semantics is not monotone over Ps(B).
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level, this is achieved via the Smyth powerdomain over the semantic universe of
elements. At the logical level, we accomplish this via the Smyth powerdomain
over the standard two-valued booleans. A reﬁnement notion is developed and
its soundness is proved for a ﬁxed set of semantic elements. Standard models
and semantics of ﬁrst-order logic are subsumed by our framework as “com-
plete” models, where all information is present. We decompose our seman-
tics into a consensus (the union of the Smyth powerdomain) of an optimistic
and a pessimistic semantics. That way, one can compute this semantics as
a standard model check in ﬁrst-order logic over a model lifted by the Smyth
powerdomain, where the signature is extended with a complementary symbol
for each predicate symbol in the original signature.
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